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gobies, which obtain most of their 
food via cleaning. Some obligate 
cleaners, such as L. bicolor and 
L. phthirophagus, mostly eat fish 
mucus and so are not considered as 
cooperative as the rest. But even the 
supposedly very cooperative ones, 
like L. dimidiatus, will eat mucus 
when they can get it. Most cleaner 
fish, however, are facultative cleaners 
which means they do not rely solely on 
cleaning for food. Facultative cleaners 
tend to be juveniles, such as some 
butterfly and angel fishes and many 
wrasses. Some wrasse clean fish as 
juveniles but eat corals as adults. 
What are the latest findings on 
cleaner fish? The evolutionary 
stability of cleaning mutualism has 
been recently examined. Cleaning 
interactions resemble the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: predators can cheat by 
eating the cleaner, while cleaners 
can cheat by eating mucus; hence 
both partners may cooperate or 
defect. But the solution is not a form 
of reciprocity, because the predator 
terminates the game if it cheats and 
so tit-for-tat-like strategies are not 
possible. Hence, L. dimidiatus are 
virtually unconditionally cooperative 
towards predators in the wild, 
though less so in the laboratory. 
L. dimidiatus also provide much 
tactile stimulation (rubbing with their 
pelvic fins) to predators, apparently 
to reduce conflicts from occurring. 
Non-predatory clients, however, use 
different control mechanisms: clients 
that can access only one cleaning 
station rely on aggression to control 
cheating cleaners, whereas those that 
can access more than one station flee 
and switch to another station. Oddly, 
the risk of aggression from predators 
toward nearby prey fish is greatly 
reduced as a by-product of cleaner fish 
presence and the tactile stimulation of 
predators by cleaner fish, suggesting 
cleaning stations act as safe havens 
from predator aggression. 
Probably no surprise to most 
snorkelers, a recent study confirmed 
that cleaner fish have evolved some of 
the most conspicuous combinations 
of colors and patterns in the marine 
environment: they tend to be yellow or 
blue, aspects that are in stark contrast 
to their stripes and make them stand 
out from the reef background; blue 
in cleaners also attracts more clients 
to cleaning stations. Many new 
species of cleaner fishes have also 
been reported, even one of a shark 
apparently functioning as a ‘cleaner’ 
with a ‘client’ fish scraping its body 
against the shark’s body; in this 
case there appears to be no benefit 
to the cleaner. Intriguingly, a recent 
molecular analysis suggests that 
cleaning in Labroides spp. evolved 
once, from a coral feeding lineage in 
the Miocene (~9.5 million years ago).
Any other oddities about cleaner 
fish? You bet! L. dimiditus become 
infected as a result of their cleaning 
behaviour when they feed on parasitic 
worms encysted in the skin of clients, 
a novel form of parasite transmission 
mediated by cleaning. And remarkably, 
L. dimidiatus cleans its mimic, the 
fangblenny Aspidontus taeniatus.
Should we keep cleaner fish in 
aquaria? Probably not. Surprisingly,  
L. dimidiatus are one of the top ten 
most exported fish to the US and UK. 
In Sri Lanka alone, an astonishing 
20,000 were traded one year. The 
direct and indirect effects of the large-
scale removal of this ecologically 
important species are unknown. 
To make matters worse, aquarium 
suitability information indicates 
L. dimidiatus is one of the two top 
species known not to acclimatize well 
to aquarium conditions. The other is 
mandarin fish. In Brazil, cleaner gobies 
were the sixth most exported marine 
ornamental fish species between 1999 
and 2001. Unfortunately, only some 
cleaner gobies and temperate cleaner 
wrasse are bred in captivity. 
Who cleans the cleaners? Everyone 
asks this question. They clean each 
other! Especially L. dimidiatus. Guppies 
in aquaria do too and you don’t need 
to go snorkelling to see that!
Where can I find out more about 
cleaner fish?
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When asked “what is an emotion?” 
most people answer in one of three 
ways. One answer is to list the most 
salient attributes of emotions. The 
psychologist and philosopher William 
James, in an 1884 essay with the 
eponymous title of our question, 
causally linked two commonsense 
attributes. According to James, certain 
stimuli can trigger emotional bodily 
reactions, and our perception of those 
changes constitutes our conscious 
experience of emotions, feelings. We 
see a bear: our heart rate accelerates, 
our blood pressure shoots up, and 
many other bodily changes transpire. 
Our perception of those changes in 
our body constitutes our fear of the 
bear. More recent accounts propose 
neurobiological substrates involved 
in causing emotional reactions 
and perceiving the feelings, laying 
the foundation for conceiving of 
emotions as neural states. Modern 
emotion theories typically try to 
account for the observations that 
emotions are triggered by events of 
some significance or relevance to 
an organism, that they encompass 
a coordinated set of changes in 
brain and body, and that they appear 
adaptive in the sense that they are 
directed towards coping with whatever 
challenge was posed by the triggering 
event. Emotions also have an onset, 
a dynamic timecourse, and an offset 
or resolution; their phasic nature is 
one feature that distinguishes them 
from moods. Additional layers of 
complexity are added, especially 
in humans, through our capacity to 
control and regulate our emotions 
(at least to some extent), and to 
vicariously experience the emotions 
of other people through empathy, both 
of which are current major themes in 
emotion research.
Emotions incorporate both sensory 
and motor features. Their sensory 
aspect derives from typically being 
induced by, and directed towards, 
some object as the stimulus: we are 
afraid of a bear, and angry at another 
person. Their motor aspect resides 
in the fact that emotions motivate 
behavior, an observation highlighted 
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Figure 1. Expressions of emotion across species.
(A) Defensive and aggressive behaviors in mammals and flies. Top: dog and cat behaviors of fear are shown from one of many illustrations in 
Charles Darwin’s book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Bottom: aggressive behavior in male fruit flies. On the left a threat-
ening raised-wing display is shown, on the right ‘boxing’ behavior (a decapitated female fly is lying next to the fighting males to help elicit the 
behavior). (Reproduced with permission from Chen et al. 2002; copyright National Academy of Sciences USA). (B) Facial gestures associated 
with palatable (top) and unpalatable tastants (bottom), the latter being the biologically most basic instance of disgust. These reactions of liking 
and disliking are seen in human infant, young orang-utan, and rat. (Reproduced from Berridge and Robinson 2003.)in theories of emotion that describe 
them as action tendencies. Emotions 
have been called ‘decoupled reflexes’: 
like reflexes and fixed action patterns, 
emotional reactions are relatively 
stereotyped. We are not at liberty to 
invent a new emotional expression, 
nor to experience a novel emotion that 
is not in our biological repertoire to 
begin with. On the other hand, unlike 
with reflexes, we have some control 
over how emotions cause behavior, 
and the emotion and the behavior can 
be separated in time — my anger may 
not lead me to hit the person right 
now, but will predispose me to do so 
for some time.
A second answer to our initial 
question attempts to define emotion 
by contrast. Passions are contrasted 
with reason, a dichotomy with a long 
tradition from Aristotle through Hume. 
The modern version, exemplified in 
so-called ‘dual-process’ theories, 
contrasts emotion and cognition. 
Emotion is associated with implicit, 
rapid and automatic processing; 
cognition is associated with explicit, 
slow and deliberate processing. 
Feeling and thinking are the conscious 
experiences associated with emotion 
and cognition, and much attention 
has focused on how they interact. The 
relationship has typically been viewed 
asymmetrically: thinking corrects and 
controls feelings. Emotion regulation, 
noted above, would be one example; but quick reflection shows that this 
order of priority is apparent only 
in humans and only in adults, and 
even then only some of the time. 
More recently, the relationship has 
been turned on its head, in large 
part through the writings of Antonio 
Damasio. According to Damasio, 
reasoning requires emotion, and many 
of the complex decisions we make 
in everyday life become impossible 
without emotions to guide us. The 
role of emotion in decision-making is 
now a very prominent theme not only 
in cognitive neuroscience, but also in 
branches of economics.
A third way to answer our 
initial question is to begin listing 
some examples. Psychological 
investigations of emotion have a long 
history of attempting to demonstrate 
either that emotions fall along some 
dimensional continuum, or that they 
are discrete. The most common 
dimensional accounts propose two 
dimensions, typically arousal (or 
intensity) and ‘valence’ (pleasantness/
unpleasantness), although other 
dimensions related to reward/
punishment or approach/withdrawal 
are also possible. While appealing in 
their economy, dimensional accounts 
all suffer the same shortcoming: 
they cannot account for the patent 
diversity of behaviors and experiences 
associated with all the different 
emotions. Discrete accounts, by contrast, treat each emotion as a 
separate package that requires its own 
explanation at the level of experience, 
behavior, and neural instantiation. This 
raises the question of what precisely 
are all the discrete emotions. 
What are the emotions?
Charles Darwin had some answers to 
this question. In 1872 he published 
The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals, just a year after 
The Descent of Man and originally 
intended as a chapter in the latter. 
Darwin applied his acute observations 
to the facial and bodily expressions 
of cats, dogs and infants, whose 
emotions we regularly divine from 
their nonverbal behavior (Figure 1). 
Building on Darwin’s observations, 
the psychologist Paul Ekman studied 
emotions through one specific 
behavior: facial expression. This led to 
the idea of so-called ‘basic emotions’, 
expressed in faces and hypothesized 
to be in large part innately specified. 
Some commonly agreed upon basic 
emotions are happiness, surprise, fear, 
anger, disgust and sadness. 
There is considerable phylogenetic 
continuity for some of these basic 
emotions, in particular for fear, anger 
and disgust. Even flies and lobsters 
exhibit behaviors that are aggressive, 
and rats make facial expressions of 
disgust. These emotions also show a 
range of elaboration within humans. 
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basic gustatory disgust forms the 
foundation on which moral disgust is 
also based: they are associated with 
similar facial expressions; they share 
similar feelings at their core; they 
are described by similar words; and 
they involve similar brain structures, 
notably the insula. 
Some intermediate positions are 
also possible. Jaak Panksepp has 
articulated four basic emotional 
systems: fear, seeking, panic and 
rage. Each of these is associated with 
a particular set of neural structures 
and neurotransmitters, each can be 
elaborated to varying degrees, and 
each interacts with the other three. 
Such ‘families’ of emotions may 
map best onto the neurobiology. 
A major challenge is to provide a 
detailed account not only of the basic 
emotions, but also of the social or 
moral emotions, which evolved to 
regulate social behavior in groups. 
These include jealousy, pride, shame, 
guilt and embarrassment, as well as 
Schadenfreude, an emotion apparently 
in no need of a word in English.
The fact that German but not 
English speakers have Schadenfreude 
in their vocabulary, together with 
many other cross-cultural examples, 
suggests that the emotion categories 
depend in part on what concepts 
and words we have for them. An 
extreme line of thinking stimulated 
by this observation is that emotions 
are socially constructed, rather than 
basic features to be discovered in the 
biology. More plausible is the view 
that our current emotion categories 
will need to be modified in light of 
biological discoveries, but not that we 
will get rid of emotion altogether. For 
instance, the neurobiologically inspired 
emotion categories of Panksepp will 
likely carve nature at its joints better 
than do English words for emotions; 
and a mature theory of emotion will 
need to acknowledge that states such 
as thirst, hunger and pain have much 
in common with emotions proper.
Emotion and the brain
There is considerable consensus 
that the place to look for a theory 
of emotion is the brain. The general 
argument we already encountered 
above: brains cause emotional 
responses as well as feelings. More 
specifically, certain brain structures 
have been associated with certain 
features of emotion (Figure 2). Studies Figure 2. The emotional brain in humans. 
Some of the many structures involved in emotion that are mentioned in the text: amygdala (or-
ange), orbitofrontal cortex (red), anterior cingulate cortex (yellow), and insula (purple). Shown at 
the top are a lateral view of a human brain seen from the right (with a part of the frontal cortex 
carved away in order to reveal the insula underneath), and a sagittal view of the medial aspect 
of the right hemisphere; the vertical line in each indicates the approximate plane of the coronal 
section shown below.by Hess, Bard and Cannon in the 
early 1900s first showed that nuclei 
in the brainstem and hypothalamus 
orchestrate coordinated emotional 
responses. For instance, electrical 
stimulation of the hypothalamus in 
cats could elicit predatory aggressive 
behavior; and transection of the 
forebrain sparing the hypothalamus 
resulted in a phenomenon called 
‘sham rage’, in which the animal 
exhibited rage-like aggression towards 
normally innocuous stimuli. These 
findings suggested that subcortical 
structures can directly trigger 
emotional behavior, but that the cortex 
is required for such behavior to be 
appropriate to the current context. A 
third set of structures was proposed 
to mediate between cortical appraisal 
and subcortical execution: the  
so-called limbic system, first coined 
by Paul Maclean in his theory of the 
triune brain.
Unsurprisingly, these earlier studies, 
while still useful in many respects as 
a framework, have given way to the 
realization that emotion processing 
is much more complicated, and 
more distributed. The literature offers 
something of a litany of piecemeal 
findings — with the hope that these 
will eventually be assembled into 
a coherent framework. A literature 
search quickly highlights some of the key pieces, at least in terms of 
citation counts: amygdala, prefrontal 
cortex and insula. Neurons in all these 
regions can respond to the emotional 
value of a stimulus independently of 
its sensory discriminative properties. 
The same touch, taste or smell will 
elicit different responses depending 
on whether it is judged to feel 
pleasant or unpleasant. A broad 
notion of emotion will include many 
other neural structures, such as the 
anterior cingulate cortex in motivating 
behavior, and the ventral striatum in 
reward learning.
Work on the amygdala’s role in 
emotion has dual roots, one springing 
from Kluver and Bucy’s seminal 
work in the 1930s on the emotional 
and social behavior of monkeys 
with amygdala lesions (although 
Kluver and Bucy did not localize 
their findings to the amygdala), the 
second springing from more recent 
work on reward learning in rodents. 
The first line of work led to modern 
studies in monkeys with selective 
pharmacological amygdala lesions 
which exhibit unusual placidity and 
tameness, as well as to a large corpus 
of work in humans demonstrating the 
amygdala’s role in social judgments 
from facial expressions. The second 
line of work is reflected in current 
work on emotional memories and their 
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to psychiatric illnesses in which the 
amygdala appears to be dysfunctional, 
including depression, anxiety, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder. A 
common thread running through all 
these varied studies has been some 
relation to processing threat or danger, 
leading to the idea that the amygdala 
is most important for fear. 
Orbital and ventromedial sectors 
of the prefrontal cortex have been 
implicated in emotional aspects 
of social behavior by the famous 
accident of Phineas Gage in 1848 
(although again no precise anatomical 
localization was made at the time). 
Gage suffered a gruesome accident 
in which an iron rod was blasted 
through his prefrontal cortex, resulting 
in severe alterations in his personality 
and social behavior. The modern-day 
study of patients with damage in these 
regions of prefrontal cortex formed 
the basis for Damasio’s theory that 
decision-making requires emotion, and 
suggested that psychopaths might 
also have dysfunction of the prefrontal 
cortex. Aggression and anger have 
been most specifically associated with 
the prefrontal cortex, and regulation 
of these and other emotions fits with 
the known inhibitory projections from 
here to other brain structures such 
as the amygdala. A leading model of 
mood disorders argues that it is not 
pathology in the amygdala itself that 
can result in depression or anxiety, but 
rather a failure of normal inhibition of 
the amygdala by the prefrontal cortex, 
promising to take our phrenological 
and piecemeal understanding of 
the neurobiology of emotion to the 
systems level.
Emotion, interoception and empathy
William James’ original hypothesis of 
feelings as the perception of bodily 
responses has been transposed into 
the brain by A.D. (Bud) Craig, who 
argues that the insula contains a 
neural representation of the state of 
our body and the substrate of how 
we feel. The insula is an interoceptive 
cortex that receives a wide bandwidth 
of signals from all over the body, with 
neuronal responses to pain, nausea 
and disgust. Just as the amygdala’s 
suggested role in fear and the 
prefrontal cortex’s in anger are now 
recognized to be descriptions that 
are too narrow, the emotional role of 
the insula is not limited to disgust. 
Instead, it may work together with regions of prefrontal cortex and 
anterior cingulate cortex in providing a 
continuously updated representation 
of the current state of our body, and 
hence of how we feel, encompassing 
both pleasant and unpleasant 
feelings.
In highly social species, emotions 
are contagious and serve important 
communicative roles. Empathy is 
one example of such contagion; it 
regulates social behavior as well 
as providing us with a mechanism 
for figuring out how others feel. 
According to one currently influential 
line of thinking, we do not need 
to figure out how others feel by 
elaborate deductions from their 
observed behavior. All we need to 
do is let empathy do its automatic 
work and look inside ourselves: if 
we know how we feel, we will know 
how the other person feels. Such 
‘simulation’ accounts, first discovered 
as a possible mechanism for 
understanding goal-directed actions, 
are of course not the whole story, but 
they may account for a wide range 
of phenomena, from the contagion of 
smiles and babies’ crying, to helping 
behaviors in primates, to deception 
and manipulation of others through 
fake emotional signals. The insula is 
activated not only by experiencing 
disgust directly, but also when 
viewing another person make a facial 
expression of disgust. Similarly, it 
is activated both when feeling pain 
oneself and when seeing somebody 
else in pain. Interestingly, the latter 
effect depends on how much we care 
for the other person: insula activation 
is greater when we see painful shock 
being given to our spouse than to a 
stranger we dislike. 
How to investigate emotion, and why
Studies of human emotion typically 
measure autonomic responses, 
whereas those in nonhuman animals 
quantify overt behavior; yet neither of 
these provides a complete inventory of 
what we should measure. If emotions 
are thought of as neurobiological 
processes that coordinate a wide 
array of adaptive changes in neural 
information processing, somatic 
homeostasis, behavior and, in some 
cases, social communication, then 
we should attempt to measure all 
of these. In humans, we can add 
subjective verbal report to the list, 
assuming that this will eventually be 
anchored in the others. Our measures of emotion at the level 
of the body are often considerably 
more impoverished than at the level 
of the brain. Neuroimaging studies 
in humans, for instance, typically 
collect long time series of changes 
in brain blood flow by concurrent 
measurements from up to 100,000 
places in the brain every two to three 
seconds. Our somatic measures, by 
contrast, typically measure changes in 
the sweatiness of the hands upon the 
presentation of a stimulus, with some 
studies adding a few other measures 
such as heart beat, respiration, or 
pupil dilation. Subjective report is 
often measured only after the fact 
with simple questionnaires. Very few 
studies use dynamic stimuli to induce 
emotions, and almost none provides 
the subject the opportunity to act back 
on those stimuli. 
There is no question that emotions 
depend on the brain, but this 
should not detract from the fact 
that they also depend on the body 
and the environment, and that a full 
understanding of their nature will 
require a functional explanation of 
how they evolved, how they develop, 
and how they are adaptive. It is 
perhaps especially the need for such 
a broader view that should stimulate 
the investigation of emotion in animal 
models, even invertebrate models, 
in order to gain insight into how it 
works in humans. As a prospective 
field of study, affective neuroscience 
(and affective biology more generally) 
excels in attracting funding, is portable 
to nearly any model species of animal, 
and is wide open with big questions to 
investigate.
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